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Abstract 
 
 The basis of this thesis is that weapons of mass destruction will continue to 
proliferate and will inevitably - given enough time- be used against civilian populations 
repeatedly.  As this occurs the opposition between support for international law and the 
power of the state will intensify.  This will go on for some time and will, in all 
probability, become extremely destructive.  Eventually, however, the states (and 
individual people) of the world will realize that the simultaneous existence of 
international anarchy and weapons of mass destruction runs counter to long term human 
survival.  This realization will, very likely, lead people to eliminate anarchy, i.e. create a 
world government. 
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Introduction 
The problem discussed in this paper is whether the anarchy of the states system 
can continue to constrain and control the global threat posed by the proliferation and use 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). I will attempt to show the long-term need for 
(reconsidering) the establishment of a world state to resolve today’s most pressing 
threats, including the spread of WMDs.  In recent years, an increasing number of scholars 
have addressed the logical and practical plausibility of a world state (Wendt, 2003; Craig 
2008). Some, who have long supported global governance, or the vast network of state 
and non-state actors that form a governing framework without government, have begun 
to question whether today’s increasingly pressing global threats have eclipsed the 
effectiveness of global governance  (Bjola, 2010; Weiss, 2009) To deal with this issue I 
will discuss the effectiveness of various efforts to address these threats by influencing the 
behavior of states and other international political actors such as multinational 
corporations. These efforts include rational constrains to suppress war and its inevitability 
and the role of international law and international organizations, i.e. the United Nations 
(UN).  The question I address is as follows: How do the current threats to human 
survival, in particular the spread of WMDs, underscore and expose the logical necessity 
for a world state (world sovereignty)?  
 To address this question, it is important to first assume that the preponderance of 
power still resides with states but that more states continue to delegate more of their 
authority. This may sound like an endorsement of global governance; however, such a 
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shift has done little to enhance governance authority and reorganize power.  Decisions 
and laws have not emerged from global governance to reduce or eliminate these threats. 
Moreover, there needs to be a gradual recognition by peoples of the threat to their 
survival posed by the proliferation and probable use of WMDs.  What this suggests is that 
the spread of democracy at the global level has had little effect on state behavior (Held 
and McGrew 1999; Roach, 2010).  Eventually such proponents may recognize, as Jim 
Whitman puts it, that “our capacity to create hugely complex, intractable problems is 
advancing beyond the reach of our policy-making machinery and in some cases, our 
predictive capacity” (Whitman 114).   
           Still, there are challenges blocking the emergence of a world state. States will not 
voluntarily give up power to a world government (or part ways with their sovereignty) 
unless they think they must do so to avert a threat to their own preservation as sovereign 
states. This is particularly difficult in the United States (US) because American 
exceptionalism can lead to feelings of sovereign superiority.  Not having other countries 
to which Americans can compare themselves  prevents them  from realizing United 
States strengths and weaknesses compared to  other nations.   American feelings of 
superiority will undoubtedly be a drag on the possibility of world state formation.   A 
world government may be impossible without the support of the world’s only 
superpower.  
        American isolationism should not be confused with another challenge: 
globalization.  It has led to the proliferation of technology that terrorist groups can use 
and that can easily travel sometimes without detection, across state boundaries.  In 
essence the world is getting smaller.  Technology has greatly altered how people relate to 
3 
 
each other.  Anyone on earth who has access to the Internet, a television, even a radio is 
connected to the rest of the world immediately.  Even though these technologies are taken 
for granted they have literally revolutionized relationships.  The primary difference 
compared with the past is that people interact with others without any limitations on 
where they are physically located.  This makes things more dangerous because it allows 
states and terrorist groups to plan an attack anywhere in the world without others being 
able to effectively respond to such an attack.  In the following pages I will discuss why a 
sovereign world state could control this danger much more effectively than can the 
current system wherein sovereignty is divided among many states.  
 It is true that in a states system stopping proliferation completely isn’t possible 
now or ever. This would not change even if states were paying attention to the 
consequences of proliferation.  If all the states of the world were to fully understand and 
deal with the threat they are facing they would put greater pressure on international 
organizations like the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and they 
would increase their national intelligence surveillance efforts at the same time.  However, 
I will show that greater attention devoted to the problem would not  solve it but would 
allow states to keep abreast of the problem and be better prepared to address the 
worldwide shock that will accompany the nearly certain first use of WMDs against 
civilians.   
 Nonetheless, the lack of attention states have paid to this issue is rather surprising.  
It is difficult to believe that people in the future won't look back on this with 
astonishment.  The inattention to WMDs and their proliferation is an example of the 
"timeless and universal" folly displayed by governments throughout history (Tuchman 6).  
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In considering how best to tackle the problem we should not ignorethe logical and 
practical necessity of establishing a world government.    
 
Argument 
The United Nations (UN) is often viewed negatively.  It is viewed essentially as a 
failure—as a body designed to prevent war yet wars go on throughout the world.  But the 
UN lies at the center of a process of change.  The change is well under way. As WMDs 
proliferate and the likelihood of their use increases, states will begin to perceive the threat 
to their very existence.  This will challenge the core realist assumption of state survival:  
state survival will be changed from political survival to human survival.   Because 
WMDs cannot be controlled indefinitely by a system of states, behavior and attitudes will 
change.  My argument, then, is that the establishment of a world state is a logical and 
practical necessity to resolve the inherent threat posed by the preservation of the state 
system and  WMD proliferation. A world state would be able to unite peoples and 
enforce the rules and laws that are currently being violated and thereby undermining the 
credibility of a global governance framework. But states are being pulled apart from each 
other and becoming more militaristic. Many other states will notice this and long term 
dangers will be created.  As more people notice how much more dangerous things are 
getting there will be an increasing awareness on the part of millions that there is, as one 
author put it, a "statistical certainty of a global thermonuclear war occurring as long as 
interstate anarchy and nuclear arsenals persist" (Craig 2003 132).   For now, however, it 
is best that we work with the following idea in regards to establishing a world state: that 
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the inevitability of war can and should lead to the inevitability of a world state to resolve 
threats that could otherwise lead to globally destructive wars. 
 The best way to understand just why the uncontrollable threat of the spread of 
WMDs is inevitable is to look at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  This treaty 
was created in 1968 and has had some success in deterring proliferation. The basic 
problem here is that anarchy creates a dynamic that makes continued proliferation 
inevitable.  The NPT is a product of an anarchical world. The solution to this has been the 
creation of the states system which itself lacks coercive power.  Its success depends 
entirely on the voluntary actions of states.   As we will see, WMDs are not difficult to 
purchase or to create. When one state gets them others will also acquire them to maintain 
a balance of power. At the same time laws are being created to govern interstate relations. 
They are international in scope and reflect the interests, customs, and priorities of many 
different states.  Agreeing on these laws encourages international consensus which 
strengthens the eventual possibility of a world government.  
  As sovereignty is the central concept in this thesis it is important to define. 
Sovereignty can be defined as the unquestioned and independent authority that is 
possessed by a state. This authority comes from the widely perceived legitimacy of the 
state.  Efforts to erect a world state and construct a global sovereignty date back to the 
League of Nations and that era’s excessive idealism. This idealism was shown in such 
actions as trying to outlaw war in the Kellogg-Briand Act.  Realists claim that the 
League’s failure was an indication of the inevitable failure of the idealism that spawned 
the organization in the first place.   But what Realists do not take into consideration is 
that nationalism is just a stage in history and has been the cause of such failures.  
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Nationalism did not exist in anything like its current form before the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 and it is already beginning to weaken.  Realists do not take these 
changes into account (Craig 2003, 46). In fact, a basic tenet of realism is that all states are 
rational actors and that rational actors can be counted on to pursue their self-interest. 
Hence, Realists would predict that as states begin to focus more heavily on the dangers of 
anarchy their rationalism will lead them to pursue the self-interest of avoiding the 
catastrophic use of WMDs. My claim, though, is that the mounting threat of an attack 
will not lead states to pursue rational policies of self-preservation.  Rather my claim is 
that the states system supports the instability or limits of this rationalist assumption and 
reveals the inherent and uncontrollable effects of the threat to state preservation. 
 Take the case of dropping two atomic bombs by the US on Japan in August of 
1945.  This event changed forever the nature of warfare and it created for the first time 
the very real possibility that people can end their own existence in a war.  It would be all 
but impossible to think of a single historical event that would more quickly or completely 
increase states' concern over the need to control warfare as controlling warfare after 
Hiroshima meant possibly saving tens of millions of civilian lives.   
 In sum, international communication and travel have increased in scope and the 
percentage of all people that are affected by communication and travel has also increased.  
Two inventions particularly--TV and the Internet--have increased the forces of 
globalization.  The Internet epitomizes how relationships have changed due to 
globalization.  It connects people instantly all over the world without any spatial 
limitations at all.  Control of the Internet has led and will lead to an increase in 
internationalism and a corresponding reduction in the power of states.  I am arguing, 
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therefore, that the world is moving inevitably toward a need for a world state precisely 
because growing interdependence through technology and trade allows for and requires 
the emergence of a single, unified world sovereign.  The reason for this is that nuclear 
weapons and other WMDs will continue to proliferate.  Nations will continue to acquire 
WMDs as rival nations get them. Many non-national groups such as Al-Qaeda will work 
to get them. The growing and intractable tensions between these groups should make 
clear the long term hopelessness of the current states system. This should make the idea 
of a world government more widely held and respectable within political science and 
other fields.  
 It is of course natural to question why a world sovereign instead of other political 
arrangements is necessary.  There are many reasons for this but part of the answer to this 
question comes from Thomas Hobbes.  Hobbes most certainly was not a world state 
advocate.  Nothing he ever wrote suggested a world state or anything that would remotely 
resemble a world state.  But he provided excellent reasons why effectively dealing with 
security issues requires apolitical structure based on absolute authority.  History has 
demonstrated he was wrong when he said that a state must have absolute authority to 
exist and avoid societal breakdown.  But he was right that to deal effectively with 
security issues a state cannot divide its military.  A functioning military will always have 
a chain of command that demands obedience from those who are lower on the chain to 
those who are higher.  A military requires that one person make decisions while others 
follow. He thought that when power is divided those who held positions of authority 
would try to eliminate rivals so they could have all the power. Dividing power, therefore, 
created schisms that would lead to conflicts within the government as claimants to power 
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fought each other. He thought these conflicts would be so severe that they would 
destabilize the government and this could only be avoided by investing all power in the 
hands of a single individual.  The relevance of this to a world state is that the kinds of 
security issues Hobbes wrote about are similar to the WMD security threats that now 
require the establishment of a single world sovereign. i 
 Occasional interstate warfare is the severe but still acceptable price people have 
been paying for centuries to maintain the states system.  In the realm of international 
politics there is no enforcement mechanism or standing army (and legal force) to stop and 
prevent a state or non-state actor from using all of the power at their disposal to acquire 
and use WMDs; the global governance system relies on state cooperation and good will, 
which is usually in short supply.  Undivided sovereignty would make the use of WMDs 
between nations no more likely than between two states in the United States.  The divided 
sovereignty of the states system, I claim, is inherently unstable compared with the 
undivided sovereignty a world government would have.  
 
Literature Review 
Global governance is a concept that lies between a world state and anarchy. 
(Murphy 1999). It is advocated by a host of scholars including neoliberal institutionalists 
and other theorists (Weiss, 2009; Slaughter, 2004; Hewson and Sinclair, 1999; Rosenau, 
1995). Most argue that the global institutional framework is an evolving framework that 
is becoming increasingly flexible with the increasing role of non-state actors and the 
coordination of supra-institutions to regulate and resolve threats (Slaughter 2004; Etzioni, 
2004). Others, as I have mentioned, have begun to question the current system and how 
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we should conceive of the best practical way of dealing with the mounting global 
problems such as climate change (Bjola, 2010; Weiss, 2009).  Considering the idea of 
world government, Thomas Weiss, for instance, offers a constructive way of at least 
exposing some of the problems posed by cooperation and weak coordination under the 
current system of global governance.  
 Realists, however, argue that the threats posed by war can be constrained through 
rational structural constraints (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). They argue that in an 
anarchical environment states will routinely pursue their rational interest of power gain in 
order to further ensure their survival. For them, a world government would remove these 
constraints and lead to further destruction. Other realists, such as Michael Mandelbaum 
(2008), argue that a world government would have responsibility for too much territory, 
too many people and too many issues. E. H. Carr makes the old point in The Twenty 
Years Crisis that states have primacy in the international arena.  Francis Fukuyama 
reminds us of the hopeful fact that liberal democracy is without a serious ideological rival 
in today’s world, which means that a world state almost certainly would be  democratic in 
nature.   
 Alexander Wendt (2003), however, makes the case that a world government is 
inevitable because it reflects an evolving pattern of power and authority being directed 
upward, and not simply horizontally.  He also claims that the Hegelian concept of the 
need for recognition will foster this process, because it will give states and individuals a 
chance to compete with one another.  And this competition, Wendt claims, will lead to a 
world state. Vaughn Shannon’s rebuttal to Wendt criticized him for claiming a world 
state is inevitable.  Shannon isn’t opposed to the idea but he is claiming a world state is 
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not inevitable.  Shannon claims that we have no way of knowing for sure if a world state 
will come into existence or not.  His disagreement with Wendt is less political than 
philosophical.  He says that there is no way of knowing this because there is no way of 
knowing what will happen.  He isn’t claiming that there are political forces that would 
stop it. 
 Finally, in his article “The Resurgent Idea of World Government”, Campbell 
Craig (2008) shows that world state scholarship is beginning to increase and to be taken 
seriously among academics for the first time since the 1940s.  His 2003 book Glimmer of 
a New Leviathan documents how the realists Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Neibuhr 
both came to believe in the necessity for a world government because of the influence of 
WMDs.  Kenneth Waltz—a third realist—never took this position explicitly but, Craig 
claims, he was leaning in that direction.  Craig’s emphasis on the security issues of 
controlling WMDs as the primary reason for a world state is laid out in his analysis of the 
writings of these three thinkers. 
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Chapter 1:  
Reconsidering the Idea of World Government 
The idea of a world government did not begin with the advent of weapons of  
mass destruction (WMD's).  Centuries before the dropping of the atomic bombs on  
Hiroshima and Nagasaki people were advocating a world state.  Dante viewed world 
government as a kind of utopia.  Grotius is often referred to as the father of international 
law and he believed in the creation of a world government to enforce this law.  A lot of 
visionary thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such as H.G. Wells 
and Aldous Huxley found the idea attractive.  One time Republican presidential candidate 
Wendell Wilkie wrote a book in 1942 on the idea titled One World (Craig 2003, 133). 
 The real impetus for world government, in my view, was the start of the era of 
WMDs in 1945.  President Truman's decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan was 
the beginning of the process that makes a world government highly probable.  For the 
first time in history people had created the ability to end their own existence in a war.  
And as I will try to show in this paper the divided sovereignty of the system of states 
simply cannot accommodate the existence of WMDs indefinitely. 
 Perhaps the first major attempt at truly shifting the power to make war from 
nations to an international body was the Baruch Plan.  This plan was "presented in 1946 
to the newly created United Nations (UN) Atomic Energy Commission by the US 
representative on the Commission, Bernard M. Baruch" (Bellany 128).  Baruch tried to 
direct widespread international interest in the use of nuclear energy into peaceful 
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purposes such as the production of electrical power.  This plan sought to establish 
international control over atomic weaponry.  The failure of the plan "drew attention to the 
futility of expecting states to abandon interest in the military uses of nuclear energy" 
(Craig 2003, 133).  The Baruch plan was created in 1946 when the US was the only 
nation in the world that had atomic bombs. For the plan to succeed the US would have 
had to hand over control of its atomic weapons to the UN and all other nations in the 
world would have had to give up pursuit of atomic weapons.  This plan was presented in 
1946 just as the US-Soviet Alliance forged in World War II was turning to Cold War 
rivalry.  To say that this plan was idealistic and didn't fully take into account the political 
realities of the day is an understatement.  To think that the US, the USSR , and all other 
nations would hand over control of the use of atomic weapons to the UN while the 
system of states was still unquestioned is ludicrous.  Perhaps this is why the plan's author 
"quietly" intended the plan to fail (Craig 2003, 133). 
 The plan was a milestone in the world's march toward international sovereignty.  
It didn't explicitly call for a world government but it did call on nations to give up a 
major aspect of their offensive capabilities.  Control of military power is part of Weber's 
famous and apt definition of a state as "the organization that maintains a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence” (O'Neil 22).  The world monopoly is key here.  If the US and 
other nations of the world had relinquished a vital part of their ability to wage war to the 
UN they would have lost their monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.  They 
wouldn't have lost their monopoly over the legitimate use of violence remaining to them.  
The Baruch Plan would merely have redefined what was the legitimate use of violence 
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from having the power to use atomic bombs to not having the power to use such 
weapons. 
 Rather, the Baruch Plan would have undermined nations monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence because it would have meant that they could not pursue the 
acquisition of atomic bombs.  This power would have been given over to the UN.  Part of 
any realistic definition of having a monopoly over the legitimate use of force is the ability 
to unilaterally act to increase the amount of force available.  The Baruch Plan would have 
imposed an authority above the nation preventing this from happening. 
 After only one year of existence we see a manifestation of the evolutionary 
character of the UN.  A permanent official of the US Government proposed that the US 
and the other nations of the world voluntarily end their monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence.  This helps to illustrate how the UN is a big part of the current transitional 
phase in history.  Just a year after Hiroshima it was clear to many people there was a need 
for the international control of WMDs that the system of states couldn't handle.  And it 
was natural to look to the UN as it was the world's most prominent international political 
organization. 
 Shortly after Hiroshima Albert Einstein aptly summarized our current 
predicament when he said "the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save 
our modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe" (Isaacson 490). 
Einstein's description of the birth of the atomic age applies perfectly to the world's 
current situation.  Einstein did, however, have a significant advantage over us:  WMDs 
were new when he made this comment so he had a world without WMDs with which to 
compare it.  
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 We've been living with WMDs our whole lives so we rarely think or worry about 
them.  This is a big part of the problem. People are largely ignoring WMDs sothey 
underestimate them. They understand their danger but their containment isn’t an issue 
that seems particularly important. The issue is out of sight and out of mind for most 
people. States and individuals are waiting for a crisis. Only fear will cause people to pay 
attention.        
 This is probably the reason so many calls for a world government were issued in 
the years just after Hiroshima before the Cold War made it clear this wouldn't happen.  
People were confronted for the first time with the reality that they could end their own 
existence in a war, and they were searching for a way out.  Not knowing of a different 
situation breeds apathy.  The fact that WMDs haven't been used in a war since 1945 
breeds a recklessly over confident way of thinking. They have never been used in my 
lifetime, people think, so they never will.  Another problem is the end of the Cold War.  
For decades the specter of a nuclear war seemed to revolve entirely around the US-Soviet 
rivalry.  Even at this late date people throughout the world are still breathing a collective 
sigh of relief that the long anticipated war never occurred and that liberalism triumphed 
over communism.  It's hard for most people to imagine the use of WMDs without a 
connection to national political rivalry.  Most people's fears of WMDs are still linked to 
an end of the world Cuban Missile Crisis type scenario where much of the human race is 
wiped out in a day or two. 
It has been well said by former US Senator Alan Cranston that "most people may 
tend to think with the Cold War over and the Soviet Union gone, the danger that these 
weapons will ever be used has receded.  Unfortunately, that is not the case" (Cranston 
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13).  The primary issue here is one of stability.  The Cold War order was one of bipolar 
stability.  There was always a threat of catastrophe but the chances of this happening 
declined enormously after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.  Both sides were able to get 
a look down the barrel and they realized their behavior was far too provocative.  The 
successful resolution of this crisis was the real start of detente. It is no coincidence that 
the first major US-Soviet arms accord--the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty-- was signed just a 
year after this crisis was resolved.  This was the end of the greatest period of risk.   
 The risk of an overnight apocalypse has receded.  In reality "the sad fact is that it 
is more likely now that nuclear weapons will be used than it was during the perilous but 
more stable era of the US-Soviet arms race" (Cranston 13).  Bipolar stability has been 
replaced by a situation where WMDs could be used by nearly any nation or terrorist 
group at any time.  The chances of the world ending are remote but the possibility of 
WMDs being used are far greater now than they were during the Cold War. Both the US 
and the Soviet Union had in place effective systems limiting the use and proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.  The near disaster of 1962 had instilled in both sides a cautiousness, a 
tolerance, and a decision to forgo needless foreign policy risks.  The world was safer 
between 1962 and the end of the Cold War in 1991 than it was before the Cuban Missile 
Crisis or since the end of the Cold War.  The situation was monopolized by nations with 
effective control systems over their WMDs as neither wanted to self-destruct. 
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Chapter 2:  
The Irrationality and Destructiveness of State Behavior 
 An important manifestation of the irrationality of divided state sovereignty is 
genocide or the orchestrated perpetrations of serious international crimes. This begins 
with the idea that people can become detached from the crime and evil they commit. The 
central driver of this detachment is resentment and/or fear, which remains inherent in 
integral or dogmatic ideologies that can become embedded in notions of nation-state 
sovereignty, especially those that seek world domination. As I shall explore, irrationality 
is built into the undivided state or integral nation state (possessing pathological ideology); 
genocide is manifestation of this irrationality, underscoring the inevitability of more 
genocides (Kressel, 2002).  
 Take the case of Adolf Eichmann.  As one of the primary administrators of the so 
called final solution, Eichmann was directly responsible for the deaths of millions of 
innocent people.  After he was captured in South America in the early 1960’s and 
transported to Israel to stand trial he was examined by several Israeli psychiatrists.  
Despite the fact that these psychiatrists must have hated Eichmann intensely, they found 
him "normal" (Bergen 41). He had none of the characteristics normally associated with 
criminality.   
 This is both chilling and inspiring.  It is chilling to realize a "normal" person 
could descend to such depths of depravity.  It would be comforting to know that someone 
who could do what Eichmann did must be a monster.  But at the same time it’s inspiring 
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to realize that so much evil is responsible by "normal” people who seem to believe they 
are just doing their jobs and following orders.  It means that preventing future Holocausts 
might not be as difficult as the assumption of widespread evil suggests. It's a lot easier to 
get rid of one evil leader than it is to make sustained improvements in human moral 
functioning.  Doing this is impossible.  That ruthless individuals may be responsible for a 
lot more of the injustice in the world than is suggested by the assumption of widespread 
evil is also suggested by another paradox.   "I am absolutely convinced,” states Simon “ 
that there is no great gulf between the mental life of the common criminal and that of the 
everyday upright citizen" (Simon 2).  Again, this suggests the opposite --that "normal" 
people are instrumental in creating genocide and other terrible chapters in history.  But a 
close analysis of this statement reveals the opposite.  If there is "no great gulf between the 
mental life of the common criminal and that of the everyday, upright citizen" than why 
are there such extreme difference between people in how they act.  What is probably 
going on is that what separates the good from the evil is how they deal with their mental 
life.  A good person exerts self-control to prevent themselves from acting on these 
impulses.  This self-control could result from conscience, compassion, or simply the 
person realizing that morally uninhibited behavior will land them in jail.  
 Simon's insight that evil is so widespread in human thinking therefore, ironically 
leads to a dichotomous  view of human morality.  Most people are basically good, and a 
few people are evil.  "It feels more democratic and less condemnatory (and somehow less 
alarming) to believe that everyone is a little shady than to accept that a few human beings 
live in a permanent and absolute moral nightmare" (Stout 105).  This black and white 
approach to good and evil may be more accurate than commonly believed.  Thinking that 
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there are a few evil people and a lot of good (or at least not evil) people seems quaint, 
old-fashioned, and naive.  Believing that such terrible scenarios as war and genocide 
aren't caused by the will of the majority of people also seems hypocritical and unfair.  
How could such horrors be explained in this way when thousands of people participated 
in them?   And if the Israeli psychiatrists were right and Eichmann really was "normal" 
than wouldn't this mean that normal is evil or at least a lot closer to evil than frequently 
understood or acknowledged. 
 The best way to explain this is through obedience to authority.  Stanley Milgram 
showed in his experiments that perfectly ordinary people will kill other people who have 
done nothing to so much as offend them simply because they are ordered to (Stout 63). 
This is obedience to good or evil, which can be interpreted as virulent and an unstable 
form of irrationalism.  The average soldier isn't thinking about policy.  They are hardly 
even aware of policy.  They're just following orders and trying to stay alive. 
 I'm not saying that they're not going to think about policy.  It's just that they have 
enough to deal with and think about in performing their duties as soldiers to look at the 
war they're involved in from a detached perspective and to see it as a whole, the way the 
leader of a nation could do.  All they can see is the little piece of the war that is right in 
front of them.  And this greatly limits their understanding.  Thus, there is relatively little 
connection between the morality of the average soldier and the horrors committed by 
soldiers during a genocide.  They are not thinking  in terms of good and evil.  People who 
are on the policy making level engage in that kind of thinking.  Soldiers just follow 
orders.  It's just that they have enough to deal with and think about in performing their 
duties as soldiers to look at the war they're involved in from a detached perspective and 
19 
 
to see it as a whole the way the leader of a nation could do.  All they can see is the little 
piece of the war that is right in front of them. This greatly limits their understanding.   
 Hence, there is relatively little connection between the morality of the average 
soldier and the horrors committed by soldiers during a war or genocide.  They are not 
thinking in terms of good and evil.  People who are on the policy making level engage in 
that kind of thinking.  Soldiers just follow orders. Obedience by ordinary people to a 
sinister authority is the real problem behind history’s greatest atrocities.    
 Eichmann wasn't a foot soldier.  He was in the Nazi SS and this was a military 
style organization demanding complete obedience of all its members.  Obedience by a 
"normal" person like Eichmann to an evil person like Hitler explains travesties such as 
the Holocaust much more effectively than the assumption of widespread evil.  Even if 
there is no great difference between the mental life of criminals and ordinary people there 
is a great difference in their behavior.  The difference therefore between the average 
person and the criminal or irrational agent isn't so much what they think about.  Rather, it 
is the uncontrollable circumstances of a siege mentality promoted by the state’s perverse 
ideology that leads to a helplessness that informs the obedience to which I am referring.  
As one person put it recently in an article referring to “antiheroes” or helpless war leaders 
who commit murder: “We’re not psychopaths.  We don’t act on it. But it’s nice to see 
someone else getting away with it” (Deggans). Like the criminal inmate longing for 
escape from prison, many people long, on occasion for release from the shackles of 
conscience to escape their helplessness or lack of control over circumstances.  
 Irrational behavior is, on the other hand, such overweening obedience arises from 
the inability to effectively channel one’s aggression.  There is "considerable worldwide 
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inculcation of aggressiveness during childhood" though "there are variations in degree" 
(Segal 9).  While aggression is partly learned, the fact that it is worldwide demonstrates 
its genetic roots.  This is in line with the now commonly held assumption that aggression 
is inborn though the search for the noble savage will probably never go away entirely.  
This might be due to a romantic  refusal to accept human nature as it is or it might be 
caused by the fact that the Rousseauian tradition has commanded so much support for so 
long (even if the noble savage idea didn’t originate with Rousseau).   
 What often passes for a discussion of how not to control and deal with aggression 
is the old nature-nurture debate.  Possibly the most dramatic and telling example of this is 
the Stanford Prison Study.  Testing the human propensity toward aggression the 
researcher Philip Zimbardo designed an "experiment that randomly assigned normal, 
healthy intelligent college students to exact the roles of either guards or prisoners in a 
realistically simulated prison setting where they were to live and work for several weeks" 
(Zimbardo 20).  To Zimbardo's surprise the guards became so abusive of the prisoners 
that the experiment had to be stopped early.  There is something about a situation where 
one person has complete power over another that elicits extremely violent, destructive 
responses. 
 That this isn't confined to psychological studies was demonstrated a few years ago 
in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.  This scandal was disgraceful and embarrassed the 
nation.  But it was entirely predictable.  US soldiers were given complete power over 
inmates in a prison.  There was no oversight.  It was a recipe for abuse.  It was a failure of 
those in positions of authority in the army just as it was of the soldiers who perpetrated 
the abuse.  Conditions were set in place that made this scandal likely if not inevitable. 
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 The Stanford Prison Study and Abu Ghraib help remind us that certain situations 
elicit aggression from ordinary people who are suddenly equipped with unchecked power 
or prompted to use this power, in irrational, violent ways.  The difference here between 
ordinary people and irrational people is that ordinary people usually engage in aggression 
only in a situation where one has absolute control over others.  Brutal aggression is 
typical but is only typical under certain conditions.  
 As previously discussed, part of the problem with the control of WMDs is that 
people use their own values when they think about the future.   Planning the annihilation 
of a major city with a WMD is so repugnant to most people that it doesn't occur to them 
that many people willing to plan such a catastrophe already exist and they probably are 
trying to do this right now. Psychologically, it is only a small step from flying airplanes 
into the World Trade Center to using WMDs against a US city.  
 In terms of the sources of irrational and violent behavior (in crisis situations):  
One final problem that is rarely discussed is the increase in size of the human race.  
Fighting a technical war takes the population, resources, and government of an entire 
nation.  Using a nuclear bomb or other WMD requires only one person.  Assuming that 
the percentage of people who would be willing to use a WMD remains relatively constant 
over time then as the human race increases in size there is an increase in the number of 
such people.  This means there is a corresponding increase in the likelihood that the one 
person willing to use WMDs will get their hands on a WMD.  This is analogous to 
comparing the homicide rate of New York City with Tampa.  While the rates may be 
similar the number of homicides in New York City will be far greater because the 
population of New York City is eight million people while the population of Tampa is 
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less than 400,000.  Thus the size of a population is relevant to the likelihood of a criminal 
act occurring.  And this includes acts of terrorism.  
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Chapter 3:  
Why Global Governance Persists and the World Isn’t Ready Now 
In his book, The Case for Goliath:  How America Acts As the World’s 
Government in the 21st Century, Michael Mandelbaum puts forward some excellent 
reasons why a world state wouldn't come into existence without WMDs:  "a world 
government would, by definition, have responsibility for establishing order everywhere, 
and so would have to go about the task of supplying authority in the chaotic corners of 
the world" (Mandelbaum  199).  The ability to supply order would fall naturally on the 
rich countries as they have greater resources to draw on. This would lead to resistance by 
the rich countries.  This would particularly be a problem because the rest of the rich 
countries are democratic and therefore this resistance would be registered at the polls.  If 
the rich countries were governed by authoritarian systems then their rules could 
command military support for these "chaotic corners." The majority of people in 
democracies can't see any direct benefit to this support and they will stand in the way of 
political leaders trying to do this. The fact that the people and not the leaders do the 
fighting would limit backing also.  This lack of support would be especially pronounced 
because nothing arouses more popular opposition than sending troops into harms way. 
 This is related to what is or will be the biggest obstacle to a world government.  
This is the change in the pattern of economic redistribution that would occur in a global 
state.  Taxing the rich to give to the poor would shift from taxing the rich in the rich 
world to give to the poor in the rich world to taxing the rich in the rich world to give to 
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the poor in the Third World.  The chasm that separates the rich in the rich world and the 
poor in the Third World is enormous. 
 Hence, the people who benefit the most from the current situation are the affluent 
in the wealthy countries. They have more political power than any other group of people 
in the world and will be able to resist changes to the international political structure much 
more effectively than their tiny percentage of the human population would suggest.  It 
will require a tremendously powerful set of political dynamics to get this small but 
influential number of people to give in to this new arrangement.  This won't happen until 
they realize that not doing this would be even worse than doing this.  That will require 
some extremely strong persuasion. 
 That the distance between where the world is now and a world state is vast is 
made manifest by a simple fact:  in the twentieth century "no government seriously 
contemplated the ultimate formal surrender of sovereignty for the purpose of creating a 
world government" (Mandelbaum 197).  It is not on anyone’s agenda.  No one is thinking 
about this as most people are still too busy celebrating the triumph of liberalism in the 
Cold War.  This triumphant mood has only been slightly qualified by the war on terror 
and it is part of the problem as well.  It helps keep people focused on the present.  During 
the Cold War it was natural to think about the future of US-Soviet relations.  The tensions 
of the Cold War created anxiety and anxiety naturally drives people to focus on what is 
coming next.  Fearing the future causes people to think about the future. Now people 
think they’ve got it easy.  There doesn't appear to be anything to fear.  People are locked 
into the present. Thinking about future political changes seems painless, as such changes 
would be minor.  
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As Hedley Bull put it:  “The advocate of world government can show his scheme 
to be feasible as well as desirable only by admitting that international relations do not 
resemble a Hobbesian state of nature:  that in it covenants without the sword are more 
than words" (Bull 263).  Here is a succinct, accurate explanation of why the world isn't 
ready for a world government.  What Hedley Bull is not anticipating, however, is the 
growing world-wide recognition of the dangers of WMDs.  When enough people are 
scared they will start looking for an exit from their predicament. 
 When they realize other people all over the world are doing the same thing, they 
will have a covenant without the sword that is worth far more than words.  The covenant 
they will have is self interest.  All people will know that they share with all other people a 
vitally important interest in controlling WMDs.  My argument is that a world government 
will probably emerge because the states system isn't equipped with the resources to 
control WMDs.  Anarchy creates an opportunity for any terrorist group or nation who can 
acquire a WMD the opportunity to use one.  This is just another way of saying that 
anarchy reigns in international affairs at the same time that WMDs exist.  This isn't based 
on projections of how the UN or some other institution may change over time.  My guess 
is that the UN will play a vital role in this process.  As the world's most prominent 
international political organization, it is the natural place for people looking to escape the 
fears they will feel when the international situation heats up. 
 The issue that needs to be addressed, then, is whether the UN can adapt to the 
changing political realities.  The author, Paul Kennedy addresses UN reform in his book 
The Parliament of Man.  The first approach he mentions is the "clean out the stables" 
approach.  (Kennedy 247).  It isn't surprising that this kind of opposition is so prevalent 
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in the US considering the fact that we're too rich to benefit from the economic and 
programs of the UN and we're too powerful to need the UN to defend us.  One usually 
realizes they are hearing this sort of approach when the UN is called a debating society or 
something similar to that.  It's based on a lack of recognition that sovereignty is shifting 
away from nations.   
 Another approach Kennedy alludes to is one he calls a middle position.  This 
position doesn't seek to diminish the UN but "sets to enhance its capacities and 
effectiveness, thus boosting its position in the eyes of governments and publics"  
(Kennedy 248).  Such a change in public opinion is probably necessary. The late Charles 
de Gaulle frequently referred to the UN as “the thing” (Weiss 253).  Of course, he meant 
this disparagingly.  Even still, he made a serious point with which even UN supporters 
could agree.  The UN is not a state.  It isn’t any kind of entity that has sovereignty.  As 
previously noted it has power but this power is contingent on the will of separate and 
often antagonistic states. 
 To really understand the role of the UN in this it is important to not think of it in 
dichotomous terms.  In other words, it is important not to think of the UN as either a 
completely politically impotent international debating society or as a genuine world 
sovereignty.  That it is not the former was demonstrated earlier in this paper by the 
simple fact that every nation of the world wants to be a member of the UN.  Why would 
every single nation in the world care whether or not it belonged to a debating society?   
Nations deal in power and the UN must have some or else this wouldn't be true. But it's 
not a world sovereignty either.  Wars still occur.  There is only one way, therefore, to 
make sense of the extremely complex and ambiguous question of what is the UN?  And 
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that is to try to place the UN somewhere on the continuum between these two obviously 
false extremes.  The UN has power--real power.  But the UN opposes war yet wars are 
common. 
 An interesting illustration of this paradox was provided by the run up to the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  France and other nations in the world opposed the invasion 
saying the US wasn't threatened by Iraq.  The Bush Administration launched a full-scale 
effort to win UN backing.  They used both lobbying of the UN and a public relations 
campaign to try to get the UN to support them.  Conservatives both inside and outside the 
Administration did all they could to get UN backing.  Yet, at the same time they claimed 
the UN was powerless.  My use of the term "debating society" comes from a Republican 
Senator who used this to describe the UN during this period.  This paradox of the UN 
being both a viable political institution and a mere debating society is at the heart of the 
UN's current process of development.  The world is committed to the current political 
configuration.  It won't and can't give up the UN.  There is a need for both. 
 This is similar to biological evolution.  If one were to look at the long line of the 
evolutionary predecessors of people they would realize that each stage of evolution 
incorporates the stage that preceded it.  And it was a precursor to the next stage.  Each 
stage appears to be separate but is really part of one vast developmental process.  Living 
in the present makes each stage seem eternal.  What applies to biological evolution, 
applies to political evolution.  What appears static in the present is really fluid in the long 
term.  The UN only fully makes sense when viewed in this way.  It is a step in between 
the states system and that which the states system will evolve into.  This explains the 
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awkwardness of having two systems at once; a system based on nationalism and a 
seemingly contradictory system of internationalism as well. 
 Paul Kennedy's book suffers from this short-sightedness.  He advocates reform of 
the UN but he doesn't realize the whole system will need to be changed to maintain 
indefinite human survival.  He never deals with the issue of how the UN will be able to 
reach closure on WMD proliferation.  He is examining a stage of political evolution 
while forgetting that evolution is occurring. His thinking is stuck within the confines of 
the present system. 
 Alexander Wendt deserves credit for contributing to the world state movement in 
IR scholarship. He accurately mentions that one factor leading to this new state is the 
destructiveness of WMDs.  But he is mistaken in over-emphasizing the "struggle for 
recognition" as part of why a world state will develop (Wendt 493).  People are willing to 
pursue their struggle for recognition within the confines of a single nation when there 
exist such obstacles to a world government.  The resistance to a world state is and will for 
some time be enormous.  The struggle for recognition by itself will have relatively little 
effect in altering this struggle for recognition--people national governments giving up 
some of their recognition/prestige--these are the prime of resistance in addition to the 
resistance rich people have to redistributing wealth to the Third World.   
 Vaughn Shannon accurately points to another flaw in his thinking--his misuse of 
the word "inevitable."  By saying a world state is inevitable, he is making a claim that 
cannot be supported.  No one knows with certainty what the future holds.  Not only does 
such a claim invite ridicule, it forecloses all other possible scenarios.  This is why I refer 
to a world state as being merely probable. I can’t see any other acceptable long term 
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alternative but the repeated failures of prediction of so many political analysts should 
create a slight hesitancy in making forecasts. No one knows the future with certainty.     
Another problem with Wendt's "struggle for recognition" being a major factor in 
the impetus for a world state is similar to the problem of resistance wealthy people in the 
First World will put up to having their money redistributed to the disadvantaged elements 
in the Third World.  The problem is that the people who would have to participate as key 
players in this process are the people who work for the very national governments that 
would be reduced in power or cease to exist if a world state is created.  Their prestige, 
their name and their struggle for recognition is tied to the governments whose 
sovereignty this new political order would displace.  This will create additional resistance 
on top of the resistance created by fears of economic redistribution. 
 Wendt maintains that WMDs are a factor in the formation of this proposed world 
state but he dwells almost exclusively on the struggle for recognition . He never explains 
precisely why the forces of this struggle for recognition are so strong that they will 
overcome the vast resistance to a world state that exists.  In fact he creates the impression 
that the whole process will be smooth, easy and virtually automatic and he hardly 
mentions that there will be problems along the way.  WMDs, and their increase in 
destructiveness, is listed as paramount to the process but Wendt never explains exactly 
how this struggle for recognition relates to the control of WMDs.  Are those two factors 
separate and unrelated? When people begin to react to the fears the proliferation or use of 
WMDs will create, will this lead to a greater degree of the struggle for recognition?  The 
struggle for recognition will spur the creation of a world government but it will only do 
this after it becomes obvious to the majority of people that human survival hinges on this.  
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And even then the struggle for recognition will be at most a secondary and less important 
variable while the quest for security is paramount. That people have a hierarchy of needs 
with biological survival ahead of the struggle for recognition is indisputable.  Yet Wendt 
ignores this.  
As Daniel Deudney puts it  "For the foreseeable future, and perhaps forever, the 
physical survival of vast numbers of human beings, and much of the nonhuman life on 
earth, rests upon the adequacy of the system to restrain the large-scale use of nuclear 
weapons" (Deudney 245).  In this statement Deudney puts forward the primary reason a 
world government is so likely.  How the people and nations of the world will go about 
maintaining security is the one issue on which the possibility of a world government 
hinges.  All other factors supporting the possibility of a world government are of 
secondary importance to the one.  Only this issue will force people to confront the fact 
that a system of divided international sovereignty cannot —that is a system of states-- 
cannot last indefinitely without catastrophe.   
 Concerning this issue, Deudney states,  "Arguments about the relationship 
between nuclear weapons and the state system fall into five broad groups, which I label 
classical nuclear one worldism, nuclear strategism, automatic deference statism, 
institutional deterrence statism, and federal-republican one worldism" (Deudney 245).  
The first view, classical nuclear one worldism is based on the "simple argument that the 
size of state viability has shifted:  nuclear weapons have pushed states from the moderate 
and tolerable vulnerability of a second anarchy into the intolerable vulnerability of first 
anarchy, and in this situation security can only be obtained through the erection of a 
larger, all-encompassing world government" (Deudney 246). 
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 One evident problem with this is that it doesn't appear to fit the conditions of 
international politics.  The behavior of states has not changed substantially since the 
beginning of the era of WMDs in 1945.  If this now proves to be correct, it will be based 
on future changes that have been predicted by IR theorists like  Deudney and Alexander 
Wendt.  The accuracy of this thesis rests completely on greater numbers of people 
throughout the world-- both political leaders and ordinary citizens-- coming to understand 
the dangers of the current system.  Unless and until this happens this theory is impossible.   
Fear is the great motivator of states necessary to end the current system.  
 "The second position, nuclear strategism, holds that the advent of nuclear 
weapons makes no decisive break in world politics and observes the behavior of states to 
be largely the same before and after their arrival" (Deudney 246).  Essentially, this theory 
is a description of the status quo.  Conflict is an endemic and unavoidable part of the 
system.  Nuclear strategism predicts that nations seeking security in a nuclear world will 
prepare for a variety of options involving the use of nuclear weapons.  The advent of the 
nuclear age didn't change anything.  It was at this time that the Baruch Plan was prepared.  
To fully understand the reasons for this plans failure it is necessary to take a look at the 
thinking of Thomas Hobbes. 
 Hobbes is one of the most influential political theorists of all time.  This is truly  
amazing considering that Hobbes’ philosophy has been spectacularly unsuccessful.  His 
primary contention was that political power was indivisible. He claimed that divided 
power invariably led to destabilizing power struggles.  All authority had to be invested in 
one person--a monarch or some other type of authoritarian leader. At the time of his 
writing the English parliament was showing that Hobbes was mistaken by taking power 
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away from the king.  The failure of his system was even more obvious a century later 
when the US Government was founded with a constitutional system that divided power 
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.  Every 
democratic nation in the world is a testament to his failure.  Yet, he is still widely read 
and highly regarded.  The reason for this is that he does an excellent job of describing 
military power.  Military power cannot be divided.  If it was divided we would end up 
with absurd scenarios like one governmental authority trying to fight a war with ground 
troops while another authority was using the air force to drop bombs on the area occupied 
by the ground troops.  There must be unity of military command for a state to not be 
completely dysfunctional. 
 For there to be a viable world government it will have to have a monopoly on the  
use of force.  Political power has already begun to shift away from nation-states.  This 
doesn't alter the fact that the UN and other international organizations are still entirely 
subservient to nation-states.  Nations need the UN but they have not transferred their 
monopoly of the use of force to it.  And it will take considerable change for them to do 
this.  
 Different governments share power with other governments.  Power is divided  
successfully between state, county, and city, governments and the national government in 
the US and between the governments of the nations of the world.  But for a state to be a 
state, that is to function at all without completely breaking down--it has to maintain a 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory.  The tremendous success 
the US and many other nations have had in dividing power has confused many people 
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about this.  Divided power has led many people to falsely believe that military power is 
divisible. 
 This is particularly true of the left.  Liberals see that political power has been  
successfully divided.  This leads them to falsely assume that military power can be 
divided as well.  This belief also leads them to overestimate the efficacy of the UN and it 
instills other false ideas such as thinking that the UN is autonomous and does not owe its 
existence to the voluntary decisions of the US and other states.   
 Conservatives understand this.  But the mistake conservatives make is believing  
the UN is politically irrelevant.  They're not aware that the UN has real power.  It has real 
power even if this power has been given to it voluntarily. 
 The third and fourth answers to the nuclear-political question are the “two  
varieties of deterrence statism, and they emphasize the stabilizing effect of deterrence.   
The basic argument of deterrence statism is that nuclear weapons have significantly 
altered the behavior of states by making war between nuclear armed states prohibitively 
costly"  (Deudney 247).  The first one is automatic deterrence statism and this is based on 
the notion that the use of nuclear weapons or other WMDs can be avoided by maintaining 
extensive nuclear forces in order to deter nuclear use. 
 The second version of deterrence statism is institutional deterrence statism and  
it emphasizes that deterrence of the use of WMDs has "institutional prerequisites"   
(Deudney 247).  It places great importance on internal institutions of the state in  
"perfecting deterrence" and views interstate arms control as an important process through 
which states communicate to one another their recognition of the nuclear facts of life and 
their political relations and force structures in order to reduce the possibilities of nuclear 
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war or use" (Deudney 248).  This position accurately recognizes that deterrence isn't 
based entirely on policies pursued by the political leadership of nations.  It involves 
adjustments internal to the society, as well. 
 Deterrence statism in both its forms is an excellent short term strategy and it  
closely resembles the basic strategy of deterrence pursued by the US during the Cold  
War. It was the best strategy under the circumstances.   A nuclear era requires the 
establishment of an institutionalized commitment to deterrence.  This prevented a war 
between the US and the Soviet Union.  It was practical and effective.  The primary reason 
it worked was that most people had not thought far enough ahead.  As this forces most 
people to focus on the present and they were not dealing with the fact that the inevitable 
power of WMDs and their increase in destructive power made the system of states 
impractical in the long term. 
 Deterrence statism was the lesser of all possible evils.  It took a chance on 
nuclear war but only a chance.  If this chance hadn't been taken than there would have 
been no deterrence to Soviet expansion.  It was a compromise on the part of the US 
between caving in and taking provocative actions that would lead eventually to nuclear 
conflict. It worked in ending the Cold War to the favor of the US and the west.   
 Deterrence statism, however, isn't just a Cold War policy.  The idea behind  
deterrence statism works against any and all manner of potential US adversaries.   
Whenever the leader of a foreign nation that is hostile to the US realizes that provoking 
or attacking the US would bring down on itself formidable retaliation than deterrence  
statism is working. 
 The problem with deterrence statism is that it can't last indefinitely.  It is a short  
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term solution that Americans believe can be safely extended indefinitely.  Eventually the  
power gap between the US and other nations will narrow.  Other nations will acquire and 
stockpile WMDs.  Perhaps even more urgent and is the issue of the issue of malevolent 
non state actors (MANGOS) (Deudney 259). When an Osama bin Laden or a Timothy 
McVeigh get control of WMDs there will be no way to track them because they're not 
leaders of nations with defined geographical boundaries.  The only reason the US was 
able to retaliate militarily for the 9-11 attacks was because Afghanistan was unwilling to 
hand over Osama bin Laden even though he was not working through a national 
government to orchestrate these attacks.  Otherwise our "retaliation" would merely have 
been Osama bin Laden's (if we had caught him) criminal prosecution as it was for 
Timothy McVeigh.  MANGO's are particularly dangerous because often times the only 
retaliation against them is prosecution.  They can hit the US but there will be no way for 
the US to hit back when they acquire WMDs.  This is particularly true in cases like 
McVeigh when the MANGO is an American. 
 "The final position, federal-republican nuclear one worldism is much less 
developed and unrecognizable" (Deudney 247).  Like nuclear one worldism it holds that  
WMDs have made the statist approach to providing security ineffectual, and that  
continual security in an era with WMDs requires the "establishment of an 
institutionalized division between territorial units and nuclear capability."  Instead of 
either the continuation of interstate anarchy or the establishment of a world state, a 
federal-republican federation of strong mutual restraint is needed to provide security" 
(Deudey 247). 
 There is one basic problem with this theory. It doesn't grant to the international  
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body it proposes creating a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  Unless this body  
has such a monopoly it isn't understanding this. 
 Again, psychological projection is the problem.  What would I do?  This is the  
question people ask.  But the answer they get is that they wouldn't start a war or a  
genocide or use WMDs.  But what most people would do has not been the issue.  It's 
what members of the sociopathic fringe all societies have that's the issue.  The monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force has to be a monopoly for there to be unity of command.  
And as previously demonstrated, unity of command is necessary for the state (world state 
or nation-state) to not be completely dysfunctional and break down.  Political power can 
be effectively divided between a world state and the nations of the world but military 
power has to be unified.  These two forms of power should not be confused.    
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Chapter 4:  
Proliferation and Public Opinion 
 To really understand the theory being advanced in this paper, it is necessary to go 
through the possible scenarios as they unfold step by step, bearing in mind that I'm 
making no claim about when this proposed world state is likely to develop.  It could 
occur either twenty or thirty years or it could take a century or longer.  Time is the one 
aspect of this theory that is most difficult to predict and it forms no part of this thesis.  I 
agree with Alexander Wendt that the stages leading to a world state do not depend on a 
specific time frame.  There are too many unknowns to predict how long the route from 
anarchy to a world government might take. 
          The first stage in this likely progression is the continual proliferation of WMDs.  
That WMDs will continue to proliferate is obvious and wholly uncontrollable.  Many 
states that don't have them will seek them and in some cases will acquire them.  As these 
weapons proliferate the states will increase efforts to acquire them and will also in some 
cases, succeed.  Over a matter of five or ten years or 20 years or maybe as much as 50 
years--there will undoubtedly be a large increase in the number of states with WMDs.  
This process will continue indefinitely.  
           The NPT will probably slow down this process but it has no way of stopping it for 
"the striking reality is that there is no central authority" (Weiss 2010, 29).  It comes as no 
surprise that the attempted enforcement of this treaty has led to the "relatively spotty 
success of non-proliferation efforts" (Cabrera525). It is not difficult to imagine that many 
38 
 
other states will be able to come into possession of WMDs if and when they decide to 
seriously pursue them. The US accomplished this feat in 1945. Other states can’t be that 
far behind.     
         It is true that continued proliferation will probably lead to increased policing by 
the UN and that in time this process will be supported by a US alarmed out of its 
traditional isolationism.  Even in the unlikely event that the US were to fully commit 
itself to combating non-proliferation it would run into some very powerful obstacles.  The 
first of these, no doubt, is power.  The US is the world's only superpower in this post 
Cold War world and the US acounts for only five percent of the world's population and 
about one quarter of its economy.  This is a far cry from anything that could be accurately 
called a world hegemony.  We are in a unipolar world only to the extent that the US is the 
world's only visible power not that we can control the actions of all or even most of the 
world's some two hundred states. 
           Lack of power, however, is far less important than the way in which the problem 
of proliferation manifests.  The power of the US allows us to assemble vast military 
resources to strike at identified targets like Afghanistan and Iraq.  It does not grant us the 
virtual omniscience to know what's going on nearly everywhere in the world.  Only this 
knowledge would allow us to fully and effectively combat proliferation. There are far too 
many ways for proliferation to occur for it to be contained indefinitely. 
            Proliferation occurs wherever one person in one state is given (or steals) 
information on constructing or buying WMDs by one other person in another state.  
There are for practical purposes an essentially unlimited number of ways for this to 
occur.  The US simply does not have even a small fraction of the resources necessary to 
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prevent this largely invisible process from occurring.  This is even more true now as most 
Americans are oblivious to the approaching dangers.  Proliferation isn't an issue many 
people or politicians are concerned with. The 9-11 terrorist attacks did not fully alter 
most Americans' feelings of post Cold War invincibility.  These attacks are still largely 
viewed as an isolated episode.  Rarely do Americans worry about how long it will take 
for terrorists of the 9-11 variety to acquire WMDs. 
 Proliferation will occur.  And this will cause more proliferation as states try to 
balance the power of states that have already acquired WMDs.  At first these processes 
will be viewed as local problems like the already mentioned nuclear standoff between 
India and Pakistan several years ago.  Few people in this part of the world worried very 
much about this near miss because they saw no self interest in it.  It was viewed as 
someone else's problem.  In a sense this was true but it illustrates a dangerous 
phenomenon.  The problem here is that people still view incidents like this as being 
disconnected and episodic.  They are not being viewed as part of the one basic process of 
proliferation.  This will go on for some time. 
 Seeing WMD proliferation as disconnected and episodic and not a common 
human problem is a far bigger issue than can be easily understood.  It prevents states 
from working together to stop proliferation.  And it prevents most states from realizing 
they have an interest in the proliferation of WMDs into areas of the world far removed 
from them. States are still thinking about specific threats like the USSR worrying about 
the US or Pakistan responding to India. The rate of proliferation will increasing 
significantly when they begin to see the problem in a more general fashion and they 
realize WMDs can be acquired by any state or terrorist group and used anytime.      
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 This thinking was effectively illustrated in one of the books I researched for this 
thesis.  The author concluded that the NPT had been relatively successful because only 
India--the world's second most populous state--had acquired nuclear weapons between 
the creation of the NPT in 1968 and the time the book was written in 1984 (McGrew 3).  
The continued survival of hundreds of millions of people depends on deterrence.  And as 
"Martin Amis notes, ‘the trouble with deterrence is that it can't test out the necessary 
timespan, which is roughly between now and the death of the sun’" (Craig 2003 xvii).  
Like so many people this author was using an absurdly limited time frame with which to 
judge the success of the NPT. 
 Eventually, however, human thinking will go through what is, in effect, a 
paradigm shift--too many near misses (or uses) of WMDs will occur in too many far 
flung corners of the world in too short a time.  The intense and nearly constant media 
attention given to these incidents will eventually break down human thinking and cause 
people to reframe how they think about the issue.  No longer will people see these events 
as isolated.  They will accurately be reformulated from being seen as terrible but isolated 
incidents to being separate parts of the one issue of how humanity will be able to avoid 
self-destruction.  People all over the world who have no direct or material interest in the 
well being of India or Pakistan, or Israel, or any other part of the world into which 
WMDs have proliferated or will eventually proliferate will start seeing themselves as tied 
to the problem. 
 This shift in thinking will be a political and psychological tipping point.  People 
all over the world will begin to feel insecure.  As the dangers of WMDs are realistically 
confronted by most people for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or the 
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Reagan arms buildup of the 1980s fear will spread. And as fear spreads states will 
become increasingly preoccupied with survival. In this case survival will be physical 
rather than political. As this tipping point is reached most people will begin to see the 
long term hopelessness created by anarchy and WMDs existing simultaneously.  
            However, there will be a crucial difference as this new tipping point is reached.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Reagan arms buildup were tied to a Cold War that 
made far reaching political change impossible.  The Cold War created the possibility of a 
dangerous conflagration but it also rested on a bipolar division of international power that 
was largely immune from change as long as the Soviet bloc existed.  With the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and its satellites it's fair to say that, if not completely triumphant, 
liberalism certainty is the standard by which all political systems are measured. And that 
it is without a serious rival in winning over the hearts and minds of the worlds masses. 
 The end of bipolarity is a major step forward for the possibility of a world 
government.  The great difference between the international system prevailing during the 
1940s and the "system in our own time is that the chances of attaining some form of 
world government have been radically enhanced by the end of the Cold War and 
emergence of a unipolar order." (Craig 141).  Very few, if any, states would be 
ideologically opposed to liberal democracy.  There are only a handful of communist 
states on earth.  Obviously, this by itself is not enough for a world government.  But this 
does remove a nearly insuperable barrier to worldwide compromise.  And combined with 
the security threats that will emerge as a result of WMDs, this factor will be a major step 
forward for the possibility of world government. It should be borne in mind that “this 
condition…will not last forever" (Craig 2003 141).  The emergence of a serious 
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ideological rival to liberalism could return the world to the same situation it was in during 
the Cold War. Writing during the cold war in 1977, Hedley Bull anticipated the 
importance of ideological homogeneity to world-wide consensus when he wrote that "the 
exponents of political ideologies frequently maintain that the triumph of their doctrines 
throughout the states system as a whole would, in addition to conferring other benefits, 
eliminate or reduce the sources of war and conflict, and lead to a more orderly world" 
(Bull 243).  
 The psychological tipping point that will be reached will lead to an international 
scramble for WMDs.  States will feel threatened and will begin to act in the way fear 
encourages.  Their actions will be dictated by a degree of selfishness and shortsightedness 
unusual even for the system of states.  Whether their acquisition of WMDs will lead to 
their rivals acquiring them or to several states in their region acquiring them and whether 
this will weaken their long term security position is not what they will focus on.  Their 
fear will be strong enough that their objectives will be focused solely on getting WMDs. 
 Unfortunately this is what many other states will be doing.  This process will 
prove an old belief to be a myth.  The myth is that nuclear weapons and other WMDs are 
hard to acquire.  In fact, many countries could acquire nuclear weapons or other WMDs 
if they really invested the time, money, and resources to do so.  However, it has been 
noted that “most nations today have a cadre of well-educated scientists who could, with a 
dedicated effort, master the mysteries of the atom bomb” (Bailey 8).  Duplicating today 
what the US did nearly seventy years ago in 1945 would not be particularly difficult with 
today's scientific knowledge.  This is particularly true if the states were large and rich and 
they had extensive scientific resources to draw on--Germany, for example, or a Japan 
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acting in violation of its World War II treaty commitments. However, even for smaller 
states duplicating what the US did in 1945 is not that far out of reach. 
This point was brought home quite vividly nearly half a century ago in 1964.  
Officials at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory conducted an experiment where they 
chose “a couple of young postdoctoral physicists ‘out of the sky’ to design a nuclear 
weapon” (Jenkins 40).  With no access to classified information they were able to create a 
design for a bomb that “computer simulations and a murder board of experienced 
weapons designers concluded” would work (Jenkins 40).  The two of them did this in just 
twenty-eight months. There is no reason to think it would be difficult for the same thing 
to happen today particularly when one considers that there existed a lot less scientific 
knowledge in 1964 than today. 
 It is also true that simply buying WMDs—or the knowledge necessary to create 
them—isn’t very hard. As one author noted “virtually all forms of advanced technology, 
from computers to pharmaceuticals to weapons of mass destruction are available—at a 
cost—around the world” (Miller 163).  This is just another reason to think that the 
number of nuclear nations is only small because states aren’t pursuing WMDs.  This can 
change quickly.  And when this point is reached the tempo of proliferation will 
significantly increase.  Thinking only of their immediate security interests, rich, powerful 
states will have relatively little trouble getting WMDs.  Smaller, poorer, states will also 
acquire WMDs though primarily in a slower fashion. 
 The question referred to earlier---what exactly is the UN? -- will become urgently 
relevant.  The NPT has done a reasonably good job at preventing proliferation.  But it has 
done so with the consent of the states on whose existence it depends.  When states no 
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longer see compliance to be in their self-interest, then the lack of a central authority will 
become painfully and obviously evident.  The fact that the NPT has garnered significant, 
though incomplete, success can dangerously be misinterpreted in dichotomous terms.  
One dichotomy--the right is denied its usual portrayal of the UN as irrelevant in regards 
to the enforcement and relative effectiveness of the NPT.  So the left, it would seem, 
must be justified in thinking of the NPT, the UN, and international law as sovereign.  
This places faith in a treaty whose successes are contingent on state interests and can be 
easily overturned.  It fools people into thinking of the NPT and the UN as a possible long 
term solution to the problem posed by anarchy and WMDs.  The NPT has encountered 
success but its success is based on a house of cards--the illusion of international 
sovereignty.  And this house of cards will last only as long as the states supporting it feel 
unthreatened. 
 At this point understanding the nature of the problem is helped greatly by 
reframing the problem and dividing the human race into two groups.  The first group are 
those people who do not have access to WMDs.  These people include nearly everyone in 
the world right now.  All US citizens fall into this group currently except one person--
President Obama.  The same is true in the other states that belong to the nuclear club--the 
UK, France, Russia, China and so on.  Something like 99.999% of all people in the world 
belong to this group. 
 Currently, the second group consists of the primary political leaders of nuclear 
states.  President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron in the UK and so on.  Numbers are 
hard to come by depending on the exact political structure of states in the nuclear club but 
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it is unlikely that the sum total of the members of group two currently exceed twenty 
people. 
 Continued human existence depends on the members of group two continuing to 
decide voluntarily not to use the WMDs at their disposal.  The chance that any one 
person in this group will use WMDs is extremely remote.  The chance that every member 
that belongs to this group or that will ever belong to this group will always continue to 
forsake the use of WMDs forever is effectively nothing.  Thus, we are left literally 
waiting for someone in group two to use WMDs and we can only hope that their use will 
occur in a part of the world that we don't inhabit. 
 Another point to consider is that, as previously mentioned sociopathy is 
frequently unrecognized.  Being the absence of something, rather than something, 
sociopathy allows those who suffer from this condition to disguise their nature.  With 
enough cleverness and effort it is easily possible that a person lacking moral boundaries 
could come into control of a nuclear arsenal.  Obviously almost no one would have a 
greater incentive to disguise their nature than a politician lacking moral boundaries who 
wants to be head of state. 
 When added to this the list of other problems that could lead a national political 
leader to use WMDs such as mental instability, faulty military intelligence, or just plain 
poor judgment then this just reaffirms the point. The use of WMDs is inevitable.  And 
their use over and over after that--again given unlimited time--is also inevitable.    
 Few vestiges of the utopianism that was so wide spread at the time of the 
founding of the League of Nations still exists.  But denial never goes out of style.  Today 
people are dealing (or not dealing) with the WMD threat by not thinking about the danger 
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they are in.  Or they are so fixed in the present that what happens five, ten, or twenty 
years down the road doesn't concern them if they think about it at all.  This denial is 
similar to the mind-set that led the British politician Lord Cecil to declare in 1933 that " 
'there has scarcely ever been a period in the world's history when war seems less likely 
than it does at present' " (Carr 36). 
 This response is similar to the international response to the environment.  Each 
year is hotter than the previous one.  Large quantities of ice in the globe's northern 
regions are melting, raising the ocean level and threatening massive inland flooding.  The 
scientific community has reached a nearly unquestioned consensus that global warming is 
real.  Yet, each  year humanity sets a new record for carbon emissions. 
 The danger will become particularly acute when terrorist groups come into 
possession of WMDs.  It's true that a ruthless or psychologically unstable individual 
could become the primary leader of a state in the nuclear club.  While this is inevitable 
eventually the chance of this happening in the short term is unlikely.  Most political 
leaders--particularly in democracies aren't crazy, stupid, or evil.  Crazy, stupid, or evil 
people usually do or say something or act in ways that make them unelectable.  Poor 
judgment of the sort that was the hallmark of the George W. Bush administration is 
possible, but even Bush wasn't stupid as intelligence is conventionally defined. 
 Terrorists, of course, will fit a very different psychological profile.  Nearly all of 
them will be sociopathic, unstable or highly predisposed to the kind of thinking that 
fosters blind fanaticism.  Their membership in a terrorist group already sets them apart 
from most people, particularly most people who are capable of attaining the heights of 
leadership in a stable, functioning democracy.  Their motives for acquiring WMDs 
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almost certainly will be to use them.  A state could be motivated to acquire WMDs to use 
as deterrence like the US during the Cold War.  A terrorist group, however, is without 
geographic boundaries or clearly defined populations like a state.  There is nothing to 
strike back at.  Had it not been for the sheltering of Osama bin Laden and other members 
of al-Qaeda, the US would have had a grievance but nothing to strike after 9-11.  
President Bush would have been left trying to placate public anger by the occasional 
capture of terrorists spread out over much of the world. This would have made the US 
appear powerless and ridiculous.  Our nearly automatic takeover of Afghanistan in the 
weeks following 9-11 did much to restore US credibility but this is only because we had a 
return address on the 9-11 attackers.  An attack on the US by terrorists acting completely 
free of a state would be a public relations nightmare.  A nightmare but again, with enough 
time, an inevitability. 
 After 9-11, states still underestimate terrorism.  The states system is so old that it 
is natural to focus on interstate warfare and to ignore the possibility of terrorism.  One 
author said it best when he claimed that “terrorism seems sporadic, nonsystemic, and 
while of great interest and pain upon its occurrence, of little lasting effect” (Bergesen 
227). Centuries of living with the states system makes it difficult for most people to think 
about terrorism very much unless a terrorist attack (like 9-11) has recently occurred.   
  It should be noted that there is at least in theory, an extremely remote possibility 
of enough near misses of the use of WMDs like the Cuban Missile Crisis to scare people 
into understanding and accepting the dangers they are facing.  If enough new misses like 
this are combined with the popularization of the world state scholarship going on in IR 
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currently, people might come to their senses, realize their survival interests are threatened 
and create a world government without the use of WMDs. 
 Infinitely more likely, however, is the actual use of WMDs.  Someone, 
somewhere in the world, with control of WMDs, will find themselves in a position that 
seems to them to warrant their use.  And they will use them.  Millions of people will be 
killed.  The media will carry horrid images of death and suffering to TV screens all over 
the world, 24/7. If there is no immediate retaliatory use of WMDs against the original 
aggressor then the world will eventually breath a collective sigh of relief that the incident 
is over, offer aid to the survivors, and get back to their lives as they largely were before 
the incident. 
 There will, however, be a shift in thinking.  People will be alarmed and at least 
partially shaken out of the obliviousness they are currently directing toward the issue of 
WMD proliferation.  The horrors seen on TV will remain a permanent reminder of the 
dangers they are facing. These images will not be forgotten and will be a factor in any 
future policy discussions regarding WMDs. The WMD threat is currently an abstraction 
to most people but at this point it will become concrete.   
 This shift in thinking will have domestic political repercussions.  There will be a 
great intensification of the old opposition pitting nationalism against internationalism.  
Presumably, the left will respond with a call to strengthen international institutions like 
the UN and the right will call for an increase in patriotism and military preparedness.  In 
the early stages of this process the right will win out.  The widespread fears people have 
will result in an almost automatic increase in military power and nationalism.  Resorting 
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to military force is just too ingrained in most people and will be a natural response to 
their fears.  Most people won't know of any other way to respond. 
 This phase of history will be chaotic and terrifying.  For the first time in history 
people all over the world will become conscious of the dangers of WMD proliferation 
without the backdrop of bipolar stability.  The desperate and widespread acquisition of 
WMDs will resemble a Hobbesian war of all against all.  There will be virtually no 
possibility of an overnight apocalypse resembling the Cuban Missile Crisis.  But this 
threat will be replaced by the threat of WMDs being used almost anywhere in the world 
almost anytime.  Things will seem out of control.  Despite the fears the Cold War 
inspired in millions of people, the Cold War was not chaotic, out of control.  This era will 
be. 
 While the chaotic reaction to this tipping point will be occurring, there will be 
other people taking a longer range view.  They will notice that while their state is blindly 
pursuing WMDs nearly every other state is doing the same thing.  Those able to take this 
view will understand the futility of so many states trying to acquire WMDs at the same 
time.  This will force large numbers of people to begin looking for a way out of the 
predicament anarchy and WMDs create. 
 It is at this point the fact that “the idea of world government is returning to the 
mainstream of scholarly thinking about international relations” will become politically 
relevant (Craig 133).  The fact that influential scholars like Alexander Wendt and Daniel 
Deudney have written influential pieces advocating the idea of world government will 
impact policy makers.  In the same way that liberal theorists like Locke and Rousseau 
preceded liberal democratic leaders like Washington and Jefferson, the world state 
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movement in IR creates an intellectual justification for future action.  This belies the 
myth of the Ivory Tower as irrelevant and shows that intellectuals are participants in the 
"real world".  A paradigm is created by thinkers and it eventually filters down into 
mainstream society where eventually it is mistaken for common sense.  Thinkers like 
Deudney and Wendt are actors in the unfolding drama and not just bystanders.  They are 
playing an essential role. 
 The initial role they will play is to counter public skepticism.  The idea of a world 
government is currently viewed by most people--particularly Americans-- like the League 
of Nations - a well meaning but misguided refusal to accept the realpolitik.  Currently this 
is true but IR's world state scholarship is one of the first steps in the movement towards a 
world government.  The idea is beginning to circulate and it has received eminent 
intellectual support.  Until people get scared this won't have much impact but when 
increasingly large numbers of people begin to understand the problem they have, this 
scholarship will start to be taken seriously.  The spread and use of WMDs will force 
people to look at the situation the entire world is in.  And for the first time since the 
1940s many people will be forced to acknowledge the hopelessness WMDs and anarchy 
create.  This tipping point will create another change as well.  This change will involve 
how people think of "they" and "we".  Currently, "they" means people in distant parts of 
the world whose well being and safety have no direct bearing on the US.  This includes 
the Chinese, Russians, Indians, and Pakistani's.  And "we", of course, refers to 
Americans. 
 As this tipping point is reached people will reframe how they view "we" and 
"they".  They will be transformed into the members of group two.  People all over the 
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world will increasingly be seen as members of group two and "we" will be everyone else.  
This will be a critical and decisive break from all of history.  For the first time nearly all 
people in the world will see themselves as "we" and nothing creates solidarity more fully 
or quickly than mutual self-interest.  The US alliance with the USSR during World War 
II, when both states had a common enemy, demonstrated just how powerful this force can 
be.   
 This mental reframing will happen slowly at first.  A few politicians on the left 
guided partly by academic writings.  This will have relatively little impact on 
international popular opinion and even less impact on the behavior of states but it will 
have a snowball effect.  As more and more people are forced to consider the issue, they 
will see the hopelessness of the current situation.  
 At the same time the right will begin to react to this movement with the 
previously mentioned return to nationalism.  This will be an intensification of the old 
tension between internationalism and nationalism and it will go on for some time.  The 
pro world state forces will be countered not only by appeals to patriotism but also the 
insistent claims that it can't work.  This opposition will go on for some time. 
 Meanwhile, more WMDs will be used and more people will begin to see the use 
of WMDs as a common human problem and not one that is limited to specific regions 
and states.  The world state movement of the 1940s will return with an urgency but there 
will be a couple of crucial differences.  First, there will be no Cold War to prevent broad 
international compromise.  Second, and most importantly, the thought of the use of 
WMDs won't be something that people have to worry about until decades into the future.  
It will be an immediate, contemporary threat.  Ideological compatibility combined with 
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the increasingly obvious threats to worldwide human survival will invoke a question that 
forms the crux of this thesis.  And that question is what is the greater determinant of 
human behavior--survival instincts or allegiance to the state system?  Belief in the 
continuance of the state system and human survival rests on the idea that WMDs won't 
proliferate and get used.  Allowing for a large enough time frame, this idea is silly.  
Anarchy unavoidably means that they will.  Nothing stands in the way of this.  Facing up 
to this requires the simple use of a rationality that is not tied to any political or 
philosophical commitments.  Thus, WMDs will proliferate, almost certainly get used, and 
millions will die.  The increasingly fevered debate between nationalism and 
internationalism will make the dangers that WMDs and anarchy together pose obvious to 
all.  A new form of consciousness will begin to emerge as people begin to see themselves 
as part of the same endangered life form.  This will not involve any kind of 
unprecedented kinship among the world's different racial, cultural and national groups.  
Rather, it will be that, for the first time in history, all people in the world will be aware of 
having a common survival interest that WMDs threaten.  It would be like a Cuban 
Missile Crisis without the Cold War ideological rivalry. 
 As I said before timing is the one aspect that can't be predicted.  This debate 
between nationalism and internationalism will give birth to a synthesis. But when and 
how this occurs is difficult, if not impossible, to predict.  There are numerous unknown 
factors that could speed up or slow down the process but as long as both anarchy and 
WMDs exist it is only a matter of time before they are used.  And only a matter of time 
before they are used again and again after that.  Creating a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence is the only way people have ever been able to control aggression enough 
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to make life tolerable within a state.  Interstate warfare, despite its horror, was a problem 
that could be accepted as a condition of living with the states system.  The advantages 
provided by the states system outweighed the disadvantages of occasional warfare.  This 
ended dramatically with the advent of WMDs.  But people have been living with WMDs 
without their being used for so long that they are taken for granted.  And people are 
particularly prone to underestimate their dangers because they still tend to associate the 
dangers of WMDs with a Cold War that has already ended. 
 The fact is that interstate warfare has only been tolerable because WMDs have not 
been used since 1945.  It is only a matter of time before they are used.  And it is only a 
matter of time after that until they are used again and again.  The use of WMDs is 
inevitable.  The only way people have found to control aggression is the establishment of 
an organization that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.  There are no 
exceptions to this and, barring unforeseeable advancements in human moral functioning, 
there never will be.  This includes the UN, global governance, and any other form of 
internationalism.  They do not create a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and so 
they leave open the inevitable and repeated use of WMDs.  Their occasional effectiveness 
should not be misinterpreted as a monopoly on violence and history has demonstrated 
that such a monopoly is the only way to control aggression. 
 It should be pointed out that not believing in the eventual formation of a world 
government means believing that separate and often antagonistic political entities both 
states and terrorists groups--that have (or will have) the capacity to kill hundreds of 
millions of people can coexist peacefully indefinitely.  This is the basic reason I think the 
human race is probably within view of two and only two alternatives--world government 
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or annihilation.  Neither may happen soon but there is a direct and obvious pathway from 
where the world is now to one of these two destinations.  I am unable to conceive of a 
third possibility. 
 One final problem is what has been called the “reification of anarchy:  the odd 
idea that anarchy is some kind of cosmic material force that cannot be overcome (Craig 
173).  Living with the states system for so long and understanding the difficulties of 
creating a world government when states don’t realize their physical survival is at stake 
makes anarchy appear immutable.  To this I will only say that thinking massive structural 
change isn’t possible is, as previously noted, completely ahistorical.  Anarchy, like the 
states system, is part of the current phase of history and its undoubted durability should 
not be confused with thinking that states and people value the status quo over 
elimination. 
 Undoubtedly the best argument against a world government, however, is the sheer 
number of entirely reasonable people--particularly IR experts--who don't think a world 
government is likely.  I have taken the rather unusual approach in this paper of conceding 
that I don't know what is going to happen with certainty.  The predictive failures of 
Hobbes and Marx and many other renowned thinkers should give one a certain 
trepidation in making predictions.  For as Yogi Berra observed, "it's tough to make 
predictions, especially about the future" (Behe 206).  I refuse to make the same error that 
Vaughn Shannon called Alexander Wendt down on and claim that a world government is 
inevitable.  I don't know what will happen for sure and such a claim would be incomplete 
without at least some discussion of the ancient philosophical issues of fate, freewill, and 
determinism.  I do believe, however, that there are two significant cognitive blocks to 
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understanding and either intelligently agreeing or disagreeing with this theory.  First, one 
has to think in a virtually time unlimited frame of mind.  The beginning of this process 
could be within ten years.  Or it could be over a century.  It is crucial to free oneself of 
being locked into the present that most political analysis is based on.  The possible 
formulation of a world government will be measured in decades and centuries not months 
and years. 
 Tied to this is the need to acknowledge the great capacity people have for change.  
Sixty years ago, not long at all in historical terms, racial segregation was widely practiced 
and women were kept almost exclusively out of the professions.  Is there any reason to 
think that the deep seated opposition people have to a world government couldn't change 
as much in a comparable period of time particularly as more and more people are forced 
to focus on the hopelessness of anarchy.  It is natural to assume that the future will be 
largely a continuation of the past even though history holds no justification for this view.  
It is just the way the mind works. 
 Second, and similar to this, one has to be able to engage in an act of imagination.  
It requires imagining a world vastly different from the way it is today.  And vastly 
different from the way it has ever been.  A world without interstate warfare seems just 
too "pie in the sky" to most people.  I suggest that if you engage your imagination, and 
continually ask yourself what happens next?, you will find that you can imagine this 
occurring, whether you agree that it will or not.  And this does not require the sacrifice of 
sound judgement. 
 Naturally, one wants to know what kind of government this world institution will 
be.  At the current time I think it is fair to say that liberal democracy is without a serious 
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rival. It is possible, though far from certain, that this situation will last and that liberal 
democracy will not turn out to be merely another stage in humanity's political evolution.  
Liberal democracy serves the interests of all voters--the vast majority of people--and so it 
has a built-in security system.  Any form of authoritarian or totalitarian state operates 
under the threat of a frustrated majority. 
 The issue of how to convince people to create a world government--paramount as 
that would seem--isn't really as important as it appears.  In today's world there is no 
chance of a world government.  People are divided by state membership, culture, race, 
wealth, and on and on.  It is only after they fully realize and accept the hopelessness of 
anarchy and WMDs--particularly if they've been forced to watch gruesome scenes of 
human carnage caused by WMDs on TV that they will confront the problems described 
in this paper.  
 One important thing to bear in mind is the importance of separating two 
processes.  The first process is the essentially inevitable proliferation and use of WMDs.  
As I've stated, I don't think anyone who realistically thinks about this doubts that WMDs 
will continue to proliferate and will get used eventually. 
 The second process is the effect this will have on widespread thinking about the 
possibility of world government: "Ever since I was a student, fifty years ago, references 
to world government or world community were dismissed as sheerly rhetorical, 
meaningless phrases or, worse, as naively idealistic" (Etzioni vii).  It is natural to begin 
thinking about WMD proliferation with the a priori assumption that because people 
wouldn't agree to a world government today they will never agree to it, that bringing 
billions of people into the knowledge that their survival hinges on the elimination of 
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anarchy will change anything though it clearly would have an enormous impact.  One 
keeps reaffirming that people are opposed to world government and this blinds one to the 
obvious and powerful effect survival instincts have on political behavior.  To really 
understand this theory it is necessary to pretend that this paper is not leading to the 
probable creation of a world state.  Otherwise, thoughts of the "it will never work" 
variety blind the reader to the obvious and tremendous capacity for change history shows 
people have.  Only after one accepts that WMDs will continue to proliferate and get used 
should one consider how most people will react to this.  Then the question they need to 
ask themselves is what are people more motivated by---physical survival or maintenance 
of a political status quo that history has repeatedly demonstrated to be in a state of 
constant change?  
 One final word on the probability of this government lasting.  The best way to 
understand this is to look at prohibition in the 1920s.  Each year the US pays a staggering 
price for the legalization of alcohol through drunk driving fatalities and the various ills 
associated with alcoholism.  But no one suggests that alcohol be banned because 
everyone knows it was tried during the 1920s and it didn't work. The same process will 
support this new government. People will realize that returning to the anarchy of the 
states system would mean a return to the conditions that make the use of WMDs 
inevitable. The opposition to a world government is strong but not nearly that strong.  
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Conclusion 
This paper's thesis is based on a simple idea.  Simple but widely denied and  
almost universally ignored.  The idea is this:  WMDs and indefinite anarchy are a  
combination that insures "unparalleled catastrophe" as Einstein put it, with the essential  
certainty  of a natural law.  The writer Jonathan Schell put it best: "a holocaust not only  
might occur but will occur-- if not today, than tomorrow; if not this year, than the next"  
(Schell 183).  This isn't a nightmare scenario of which only the overheated imagination of 
an Edgar Allan Poe could conceive.  It is a realistic prudent and quite frankly obvious  
understanding of what anarchy means. 
 Why can't the UN, the NPT, or global governance save us?  Because, despite  
unquestioned power, they lack the one and only ingredient that history has  
demonstrated is necessary to pull  humanity out of the state of nature.  That ingredient  
is the establishment of an organization that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of  
violence.  In this case that organization would have to be global.  
 Agreement or reasonable disagreement with this thesis rests on the elimination  
of a few cognitive blocks.  These include a focus on the present or on only the near 
future that nearly all political analysis encourages, and an understanding of people's  
capacity to alter their political values when their survival is threatened.  This last point is  
particularly difficult for nearly all current writers on world government.  Even supporters  
of the idea seem to think that people won't change or to ignore the possibility  
altogether.  But the human capacity for change is an indispensible part of this process.   
59 
 
And it is the only reason world government is possible in the future but isn't now. 
 Will there be a world government?  I think so but I freely admit I don't know for  
sure.  Personally, I can't think of another long term alternative except for human  
annihilation.  I have deliberately avoided any claims of inevitability other than the use of  
WMDs given continued anarchy.  That is just too obvious to ignore.   
 In parting I'd like to point out just one thing.  I think it can be said that, not-  
withstanding unavoidable imperfections, this paper is rational.  It contains no  
adolescent naïveté, unjustified faith in human benevolence, or what E. H. Carr called the  
“nemesis of utopianism” (Carr 36). This thesis rests entirely on the states of the world  
doing what they've always done which is pursuing their self-interest. A rational paper  
advocating belief in the probable eventual formation of a world government can only  
mean such a belief is no longer to be thought of as the preserve of lunatics.  This is  
undoubtedly part of a major shift.  The coming years and decades will see an increase in  
the tempo of world state scholarship. Hopefully, like this paper, this can be done  
without the sacrifice of political realism. 
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